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TextBTheFinandMaicCrisisof2008andBeyond
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PaulM.Romer
Pre-reading
PaulM.Romer（1955- ）isanAmeriistarepreneur，tlytheprofessorofeicsattheSternSchoolofBusiNewYorkUy.Heisapienousgrowththeory.RomerearnedaB.S.inphysi1977andaPh.D.inei1983，bothfromtheUyofChicago.HetaughtattheUyofiaatBerkeley，theUyofChidtheUyofRochester.HewasnamedoneofAmerica’s25mostiialpeoplebyTimeMagazinein1997.RomerwasawardedtheHorstClausRerizeinEiporarilyleftacademia，foghisenergyonhis2001start-uppanyAplia，ur2007bygageLearning.
&importantworkisinthefieldofeicgroublishedin1986and1990amoumathematicalrepresentationsofeiesinwhiologigeistheresultoftheiionalasofpeople，suchasresearddevelopment.Thisstartedendogenousgrowththeory.
ThefollowiheepiloguefromthelatestAdvanics.
Promptsf
1.Doyouknowanythingaboutthe2008financialcrisis，orthefinanami?Ifhingaboutthiscrisisbeforeythepassage.
2.HaveyouheardofJohnMayarehismais?
3.NearlyalldisaiustbeginwithKeynes.DoesRomerdothesameinthispassage?Whyorwhynot?
4.WhatarethethreeleadiioModeration?
5.Romerclaimsthat“theevefewyearsrofoundshootjusttothemay，butalsotothefieldofmaiyoufiailssuppthisthepassage?
6.Romerpoihevulyoffinancialmarketsaipriewithfuals.Howdoesheelaborateit?
7.WhydoesRomerbelievethatthecrisismakesaparticularlyexdparticularlyimportant，timeformaics?Whatdoyouthinkaboutthedevelopmentofmaics?
8.Whatisthegenerallogidtheanizatiohispassage?Workoutanideaflowcharttoillustratetrainofthoughtinthispassage.
9.Howdoestheauthorachievebeingadbeithesametime?
[1]TheperiodfromtheendoftheVolcker1disinflationinthemid-1980sto2007wasoneofuedmaicstability.Theueswentthroughonlytworesihofthemmild.Theueneverexceeded8perdtherewereoersinfell.
[2]TherearethreeleadiionsofthisGreatModeratioissimplygoodlutheformofsmallershogtheey.Thesedisthestructureoftheey，suchasalargerroleofservidimprovementsiemehirdisimprovedpolipolicymakerswereuheodeloftheeyasofinflatioedlypursuedpoliciesthatflatioheninducedrestoreduceit.Withthetriumphofthenaturalratehypothesis3，geoicestimatesofthenaturalrate，andtheemergenceofasusthatinflationshouldbekeptlow，thisboom-bustcycledisappeared.
[3]Thisperiodofstabilityei2008—thoughwhethertheendoraryorpermayetknown.Housepriceshadbeenrisingrapidlysie1990s.By2003，boththelevelofrealhousepridtheratioofthepricesofexistihecostsofbuildingnewoheirpreviousphs.Yettherapidpricreasesuedforthreemoreyears.Theincreasesaniedby—andperhapsfueledby—thegrowthofgages，manyofthemissuedonthebasisoflittleoriooftheborroroliferationofneadinsurigages，ofteunclearwhtheriskofdefault.
[4]Housepricesstartedfallingin2007，andthemayweakehereafter.Thedethevalueofhousisreduetworthofmanyfinanstitutionsandiaintyaboutthath，asignifitstraimarkets.Forexample，spreadsbetweeeshtloaweenbanksaesorosesharply，andtheFederalReserve4aralbaoilyimarketsinvariousways.Buttheinitialdownturninthemaild.Forexample，asofAugust2008，aohattheeyrobablyithatanyrewaslikelytobeeveheprevioustwo.
[5]Iember2008，however，LehmanBrothers5，amajoribank，dekrupttheaftermath，financialmarketssuffereddramaticturmoil，andtheregedfrommildtosevere.Equitypricesfellbymorethainjust4weeks;spreadsbetweeesoionalbutslightlyriskyloansahesafestandmostliquidassetsskyrodmanyborrowerswereuoborrowatae.RealGDPsuffereditslargesttwo-quarterdece1957-1958;aember2008toMay2009，employmentfellby3.8perdtheueroseby3.2pertagepoints.Bymostmeasures，thereof2007-2009wasthelargestsinceWorldWarII.Mariessufferedsimilardownturns.
[6]Theinitialpartoftherecoveryhasbeenslow.Inadditivieloymentwillremaiuralrateandoutputwillremaisnormallevelforyears，andthattheeventsof2008and2009mayhavelosonthenormallevelsofuandoutput.Aeddebateaboutwhat，ifanything，policymakersshoulddotospeedtheredredudamage.
[7]Theevefewyearsrofoundshootjusttothemay，butalsotothefieldofmaics6.Shateflus，whichwethoughtwehadlargelytamed，havereemergeddramatically.Moreover，theheretreisverydifferentfromthatofothermajorpostwarres.Finaioohavebeeral，andtightmoarypolicyplayedlittleornorole.
[8]Thusourmodelsandanalysiswillsurelyge.Buthowisnotmanyways，maicstodayisinapositionsimilartowhereitstoodintheearly1970s，whentheemergeionofhighuandhighinflationgedacceptedviews.Then，asnow，onepossibilitywasthattheueddevelopmentswouldleadonlythtforwardmodifisoftheexistianotherpossibility—ainfactoccurred—wasthatthedevelopmentswouldleadteaedthefield.
[9]Obviously，redidamentalmaicsbeforetheyoccur.Allwedoisidehekeyissuesthatthecrisisraisesforthefieldandsomepossiblediresofresearch.
[10]Severalofthetralissuesinvolvefinancialmarkets.Oahecrisisisthevulyoffinancialmarketstoruns.Manyfinanstitutioermdebttofiermiheextremeisatraditionalbank，whichissuesdemasandholdsavarietyoflos，sues.Whyfinanstitutionsengageinsuchmaturitytransformation7，aermtractstakesuchsimpleforms（su-tdebtpayableondemand），areplicatedquestions.Butgiventhesearrahereisastrtocreatemultipleequilibriums:adebtholderismorelikelytodemandthatthedebtberepaidorrefusetorollitoverifheorshebelievesthatotherswilldothesame.Theretcrisisshowsthatthislogicappliesnotjusttoatraditionalbank.Italsoappliestoafinanstitutionfinahroughcollateralizedhtlhshort-termdebttracts.
[11]Aneofthegfinancialmarketsisthattherearelimitstipriewithfuals8.Forexample，housepricesbeforethecrisisappeartohavebeehelevelswarrantedbylikelypayoffsiesoftheworld;andthesameistrueofthepricesofvariousassetswhosepayoffsweretiedtothehousi，suchasme-backedsecurities9.Ihosesecurities，onedifficultywasthatcredit-ratingagenciesfoevaluatingtheprobabilityofdefault，andesiwouldodthereisevidepriayhaveswitsohecrisishit，withmanyriskyassetssellingatpricesbeloarrantedbyfuals.Ifanindividualbelievesthataismispriced，heorshehasaotradeinaushpricesbacktowardfuals.Butmisprigsofthetypeswehavebeendisgdorageopportuis，iegiesthatwillbeprofitablewithty.Iradesthatmovepricesbacktowardfualsinvolverisks，besialsaionsofthemisprisideraemplatingbuyilyusiofthecrisis.Iftheapparentpaensifybeforesubsidihtbeforcedtoliquidatehisorherposition，andsoincuralossihesituatioheeywasdeterifurtherandthemarginalutilityofptioneciallyhigh.Thisrisklimitstheior’sdemandfortheu，andsobluntstheforgpricestowardfuals.Ifthespecializediorsttoprofitfrarefisidecapital，theirsituationisevenmorediffiderpricedassetsaretypieswhoseretreturnshavebeenlow.Asaresult，specializediorsmayfindthattheamountoffuainfromsislowerwhenmisprigisgreater.
[12]Thecrisisalsoshowsclearlythatfinancial-marketimperfeportantnotjusttos，butalsotofinancialfirms.Muanvolvestwolevelsofimperfeebetweeeuserofthedafinantermediary，aweeermediaryaeproviderofcapital.Mostanalysesoffinancial-marketimperfeorethisfadfoetriatioimateusersandtheprovidersoftheircapital.Butasymmetriatiohefinantermediariesaeprovidersappearstohavebeeantduringtheple，manyfinancialfirmshadextremedifficultyobtainingcapital，atheiivesfagfirmsclosetobankruptcyappeartohavebeenamajorsourceofthisdifficulty.
[13]Anotherissueinvolvingfinancialmarketsraisedbythesthetransmissio-marketdisruptiooftheey.Thecredit-marketturmoilinthefallof2008wasfollowedbyaquidrapiddeeicactivity.Someofthedeewasclearlyduetothedirecteffectsofthedisruptions.Firmsthatwereuvestmesandcutbaventories;householdsthatesdidnotbuyerswhooloaiceledorders;andhouseholdswhosewealthhaddeedreducedtheiriicsoftheseeffectsareshownbythemodelofihepresenancial-marketimperfedthemaplisareiheextensionsofbusioincorporatefinancial-marketimperfes.
[14]Yettheseanalysesareileasttwoveryimportantways.First，wekhemaghedifferentels.Forexample，wehavelittleevideheimportanperfetherelatioweenfinancial-marketinstitutionsandtheirsuppliersoffuothatofimperfetherelatioheseinstitutionsandtheirborrowers.Likelittleaboutwhetheritiseffeday-to-daylending，susforpayrollaory，oreffethefinangerprojects，suewhomesandfactories，thatareespeciallyimportant.Seeoftheimpactofthedisruptioohaveoperatednhtheirdirecteffects，butthroughmoreamorphouseffethe“ce”
ofhouseholdsandfirms.Givehedowerminingtherolesofthesevariousfadtheelsthroughwhichtheyoperatedisanimportanttask.
[15]Thecrisishasalsoraisedarangeofissueslessdirectlyrelatedtocreditmarkets.Ithasmadeclearthatthezerolowerboundonnomiesisacrustraiarypolicy.Thereislittledoubtthatihet，theFederalReserveandmaralbankswouldhaveterestratesmuchmorethantheydid，andthatthedownturnwouldhavebeenlesssevereandthereuchmorerapid.Thusthecrisiselevatestheimportanceofissuesrelatedtothezerolowerbound.
[16]Amorespeculativeviewisthattheportaiyissuesfboththeshocksthatgiverisetoflusandthepolisesthathaveimportantimplisfortheiryulatorydesbeforethecrisis，aswellassomeofthemiaicpolisduringthecrisis，seemdiffiderstandwiththetraditionalviewofpolicymakersasknowledgeableaogiveoneexample，beforethecrisishit，therewerewarningsignsofovervaluedassetpriehighlyquestio-marketpractices;yetpolicymakersdidlittleinresponse.
[17]Thislistofissuesthatthecrisisraisesformaicsisfarfromplete.Othersihereashtto“liquidity”
10iofinancialturmoil，aswellasthemeaningandimportaheveryceptofliquidity;thetralbank’sroleasaleresort;howvariousfissaffectthemayirun;therolesn-cyreserves，exge-rateregimes，aorsiermininghowacrisisistransmittedatries;theseeminglypuzzlinglysmallfallininflatithedwhatthatihestructureoftheeyaheoriesofinflatioudeasofthelongtermmaiceffeancialdmuchmore.Ihefewsilverliningsofthecrisisisthatitmakestodayaparticularlyexdparticularlyimportant，timeformaics.
Notes
1.PaulVolin1927，oftheFederalReserveusJimmydRanfrom1979to1987.HewasthechiefarchitectoftheU.S.abahegold-exgestandardaionsoftheU.S.dollar.Hehelpedlowerdouble-digitinflatioheearly1980sandusheredinaneraoffiionandinnovation.
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